IMF and economic reform in developing countries by Abbott, Philip et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
IMF and economic reform in developing countries
Abbott, Philip; Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck; Tarp, Finn
Published in:
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
DOI:
10.1016/j.qref.2009.10.005
Publication date:
2010
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Abbott, P., Andersen, T. B., & Tarp, F. (2010). IMF and economic reform in developing countries. Quarterly
Review of Economics and Finance, 50(1), 17-26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2009.10.005
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached
copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research
and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution
and sharing with colleagues.
Other uses, including reproduction and distribution, or selling or
licensing copies, or posting to personal, institutional or third party
websites are prohibited.
In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the
article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or
institutional repository. Authors requiring further information
regarding Elsevier’s archiving and manuscript policies are
encouraged to visit:
http://www.elsevier.com/copyright
Author's personal copy
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 50 (2010) 17–26
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate /qre f
IMF and economic reform in developing countries
Philip Abbotta, Thomas Barnebeck Andersenb,∗, Finn Tarpb,1
a Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, Krannert Building, 403W State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056, USA
b Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Available online 20 October 2009
JEL classiﬁcation:
F3
F4
O4
Keywords:
IMF programs
Structural conditionality
Economic growth
a b s t r a c t
In this paper we assess the IMF approach to economic reform in developing countries. The impact of
IMF program participation on economic growth has been evaluated empirically in a cross-country liter-
ature, with little evidence of IMF programs having been successful. This suggests that a fresh approach
is in order. However, the cross-country approach is unlikely to provide a sound basis for drawing clear
conclusions, so we review IMF programs from a different perspective, involving a broader literature on
development strategy. In particular, it is widely accepted that a common characteristic of IMF programs is
a high degree of policy rigidity. This is in contrast with studies which hold that unleashing an economy’s
growth potential hinges on a set ofwell-targeted policy interventions aimed at removing country-speciﬁc
binding constraints. The process of locating constraints that bind involves growth diagnostics and policy
trialing. This approach maintains that not all distortions are equally important and, by extension, not all
policy reforms. From this point of view, IMF programs based on a list of standard conditionalities will
not accomplish much. But policy trialing is more relevant to actors and entities with a broader, and more
microeconomic, focus such as national policymakers and the World Bank. It is in choices among com-
peting projects and programs that trial and error is most likely to be necessary. Nevertheless, reforms of
the IMF such as the “streamlining initiative” should start from a good understanding of the reasons for
adherence to policy orthodoxy. We discuss underlying institutional and organizational reasons for policy
rigidity and consider some suggested reforms.
© 2009 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The IMF is a lender of last resort to countries facing serious eco-
nomic imbalances. Following the oil crises in the 1970s and the
international debt crisis in the 1980s, the IMF focused its attention
on devaluation and macroeconomic stability in order to restore
external balances. The reform agenda embodied in policy con-
ditionality soon expanded to address sectoral policies as well as
institutional reforms. Policy conditionality in this way was broad-
ened to encompass not only traditional balance of payments and
monetary concerns but also development strategy and associated
growth policies. The expansion in policy conditionality partly took
placebecause, aswas soonperceived, external balanceandmacroe-
conomic stability could not be achieved without changes in key
sectoral policies.
The policy conditionality of the IMF quickly became the target
of heavy criticism from both sides of the political spectrum (Bird
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& Willett, 2004; IEO, 2007).1 On the left, IMF conditionality is typ-
ically viewed as harsh, intrusive, and ineffective; on the right, the
habitual objection is that policy conditions are not enforced. Faced
with these criticisms, the IMF has accepted that the proliferation of
policy conditions went too far. Furthermore, the IMF has expressed
a desire to re-focus attention to areas which are core competencies
of the institution (IEO, 2007). In IMF lingo, conditionality must be
streamlined. Yet the IMF continues to perceive conditionality as a
useful instrument for encouraging economic reforms.
Over the years, the IMF has increasingly stressed that its poli-
cies should help lay the basis for promoting long-run economic
growth (IEO, 2007; IMF, 2005). As such, devaluation, balance of
payments equilibrium, andmacroeconomic stability become inter-
mediate targets that derive importance to the extent that they
contribute to fostering economic growth. There is by now a well-
established literature which evaluates the IMF against the goal of
promoting long-run economic growth. While disagreement exists,
the evidence is not entirely positive (Vreeland, 2006). However, the
1 See Bird (2007) for a very comprehensive survey of the most recent research on
the IMF.
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understanding ofwhere the IMF seeminglywent off target remains
controversial.
Some claim that the IMF follows a one-size-ﬁts-all approach.
According to this view, the policy template used by the IMF is
bothunsoundandoverly rigid (Stiglitz, 2000, 2001, 2004;Vreeland,
2006). Others argue that incomplete compliance with conditional-
ity is the main culprit. To the extent that program effectiveness
requires adoption of the full gamut of IMF policy conditions,
incomplete compliance will undermine the entire reform package
(Krueger, 2004). Recent IMF thinking on conditionality is closer to
this latter view (Rodrik, 2006).2 Unfortunately, it is very difﬁcult to
settle this debate using econometric evidence. Failure to demon-
strate a positive effect from IMFprogramparticipation to economic
growth does not allow us to discriminate in favor of either of these
two views. Indeed, ifwe cannot fully account for the degree of com-
pliance with conditionality (and this is very difﬁcult), both views
canwith some right claim that no effect of reform initiatives is con-
sistent with their diagnosis. What we can do, however, is to reason
indirectly. The key observation is that compliance is only an issue
to the extent that IMF conditionality offers the appropriate set of
reforms (Goldstein, 2001).
This leads us to the emerging literature on growth diagnostics,
which focuses on identifying and addressing key binding con-
straints to growth and policy trialing. Searching for appropriate
economicpolicies and reforms that constitute abroaddevelopment
strategy contains anelementof trial anderror (Easterly, 2008;Qian,
2003; Rodrik, 2005, 2006, 2008; World Bank, 2005). It involves
taking risks, and itmust build on local knowledge. Indeed, this liter-
ature suggests thatﬂexibility andadaptability carryahighpotential
payoff. If the IMF is entrenched in orthodoxy, which we will argue
is the case, one should not expect too much “growth bang from the
IMF reform buck.”
Policy trialing and adaptability to local circumstances are
especially relevant to microeconomic decisions on projects and
programs, where greater local variability and uncertainty on out-
comes exists, and require a broad perspective on development
strategy. To theextent that IMF reformsare streamlining condition-
ality to focus on core competencies, it will need to ﬁt into a broader
development strategy set in collaboration with other entities.
Hence, we believe that the policy trialing and binding constraint
diagnostic approaches are more relevant to national governments
as they set priorities and interact with bilateral donors and the
World Bank, and not just the IMF. Moreover, less policy rigidity by
the IMF requires that it questions its underlying macroeconomic
framework, a difﬁcult task at the individual level.
Any reform of the IMF should start from understanding the
underlying institutional and organizational reasons for IMF policy
rigidity. Some explain policy rigidity by the fact that staff mem-
bers face an incentive structure which discourages policy trialing
and risk taking at the country level (Woods, 2006). Others argue
that IMF recruitment policies sustain an intellectual monoculture
(Momani, 2005). This leads us to consider the issue of organiza-
tional reform.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief
discussion of IMF conditionality. Section 3 turns to the empirical
evidence on conditionality’s track record with respect to foster-
ing economic growth. Sections 4 and 5 discuss recent thinking on
reform and growth, while Section 6 turns to a discussion of the
apparent lack of policy trialing in the design of IMF programs. We
reﬂect on the organizational culture within the IMF and discuss
some reforms. Section 7 concludes.
2 The IEO (2007) ﬁnds extensive non-compliance with IMF conditions.
2. Conditionality
Conditionality serves a number of purposes. Above all, the IMF
needs a mechanism to help ensure that countries pursue policies
that will enable them to achieve external balance and eventually
repay borrowed funds (Bird & Willett, 2004; IMF, 2005). Moreover,
conditionality provides the borrowing countrywith valuable infor-
mationby clarifying the termsonwhich the IMFwillmakeﬁnancial
resources available (IMF, 2005). Adoption of IMF-supported poli-
cies is also meant to lay the foundation for a sustainable economic
growth path over the longer term (IMF, 2005).
In the mid-1980s, structural conditionality gained prominence.
It was aimed both at strengthening the sustainability of macroe-
conomic adjustment and at fostering growth. In the 1990s, the
emergence of new IMF lending facilities for low-income countries,
including transition economies, coincided with a signiﬁcant accel-
eration in the use of structural conditions in IMF programs (IEO,
2007). While standard conditionality relies on quantitative targets
for macroeconomic variables, structural conditionality requires
changes in policy processes, existing legislation, and administra-
tive and economic institutions.3 Typical structural conditionalities
have included price and trade liberalization, privatization of state
marketing monopolies, institutional reform of banking and the
ﬁnancial sector, anti-corruption measures, and legal reforms. Such
measures were thought to increase static and dynamic efﬁciency,
andultimatelyaccelerategrowth. Inaddition, institutional reforms,
such as strengthening the independence of central banks and the
regulatory framework of the ﬁnancial sector, were aimed at reduc-
ing domestic and external ﬁnancial vulnerabilities.
The proliferation of structural conditions in the 1990s was met
with increasing criticism outside the IMF. Many regarded them
as intrusive and destructive for national ownership, undermin-
ing the very objectives of the programs the IMF was supporting.
Many critics argued that the IMF was too mechanical and ideolog-
ical in its use of structural conditions (IEO, 2007). The early 1990s
saw a passionate debate on the relative merits of orthodox ver-
sus heterodox development theory and policy (e.g., Wade, 1990;
World Bank, 1993). It has also been argued that IMF conditional-
ity redistributes income away from the poor, and so has political
consequences (Vreeland, 2003).
Partly as a response to these criticisms, the IMF issued a new
set of Conditionality Guidelines in 2002, stressing the need for
“parsimony” and a test of “criticality” for any variable selected for
conditionality. These new guidelines also stress the need to seek
country ownership. Program documents are to be prepared by the
authorities in loan receiving countries (with the cooperation and
assistance of IMF staff) and should reﬂect country level policy goals
(IMF, 2005).4
The concept of national ownership is geared towards increas-
ing compliance and is widely seen as a way to try to deal with the
criticisms leveled at conditionality. If a country “owns” the pol-
icy changes, it can be assumed that it will try to implement them
more readily; i.e., without IMF arm-twisting. This should also lead
3 The IEO (2007, p. 6) deﬁnes structural conditionality as “any program condition
that is not a quantitative target related to ﬁnancial programming [. . .].”
4 The idea of country ownership is not new. Almost half a century ago, the IMF
ManagingDirector, Per Jacobsen, pointed out that the IMF cannot just impose condi-
tions and expect policy making to improve: “I must emphasize that such programs
can only succeed if there is the will to succeed in the countries themselves. The
IMF has always found people in these countries who know very well what needs to
be done. The IMF does not impose conditions on countries; they themselves freely
have come to the conclusion that the measures they arrange to take – even when
they are sometimes harsh – are in the best interest of their own countries.” (cited
in Boughton, 2003, p. 5).
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to fewer and more focused structural conditions (IEO, 2007). The
language of ownership includes a focus on broad participation of
stakeholderswithin the country. Beyondownership issues andpar-
simony in the application of program-related conditions, one ﬁnds
calls to tailor programs better to country circumstances, to ensure
effective coordination with other multilateral institutions, and to
specify conditions clearly. In principle, ownership allows the IMF
to respond to both the issue of a rigid policy template and the
discussion of conditions being intrusive, at least ostensibly.
In practice, the streamlining initiative has not led to a reduction
in the number of structural conditions (IEO, 2007). The aver-
age number per program/year has remained around 17 when
comparing four-year windows before and after the start of the
streamlining initiative in 2001. However, the initiative has signif-
icantly shifted the composition of structural conditions towards
areas that (according to the IEO) are at the coreof IMFcompetency.5
The IEO also asserts that compliance rates and program effective-
ness are higher in these areas. However, program effectiveness
relates to whether structural conditionality is “effective in bring-
ing about follow-up structural reforms as well as whether reforms
were sustained over time” (IEO, 2007, p. 16). This deﬁnition of
program effectiveness is really only of second order. As argued by
Goldstein (2001), even if countries consistently comply with the
IMF structural conditions, thiswouldonlybedesirable to the extent
that such structural conditionality is effective in fosteringeconomic
growth. The ﬁrst order deﬁnition of program effectiveness should
be related to countries’ economic development, captured by their
rate of economic growth. According to this perspective, which pre-
sumes that growth rather than stabilization and external balance is
paramount to IMF assistance, the critical question becomes: Does
IMF structural conditionality add to countries’ growth rates? One
inﬂuential approach used to address this question is cross-country
regressions. We turn to this literature in Section 3 before assess-
ing in subsequent sections IMF conditionality in light of ongoing
debates about what causes growth.
3. Cross-country evidence
This section provides a selective review of recent empirical lit-
erature on the IMF’s track record in terms of fostering economic
growth.Whilemuch of this literature has been surveyed elsewhere
(e.g., Bird, 2007), our presentation contains some idiosyncrasies,
and we attempt to provide a clear perspective on methodological
pitfalls and identiﬁcation assumptions. For purposes of readability,
more technical discussions have been relegated to footnotes.
The key question this literature seeks to answer is: Do coun-
tries beneﬁt from access to IMF loan programs or would they be
better off without these programs? Two main problems make it
difﬁcult to answer this question satisfactorily. First, IMF loans are
made in response to economic crisis. The set of program versus
non-program countries differ because the former are in economic
trouble while the latter might not be. Obviously, it would be unfair
to blame the IMF for bad, pre-existing conditions, and there are
no simple ways to establish the counterfactual needed for com-
parative purposes.6 Moreover, even assuming this selection issue
5 Core IMF areas include taxation, public expenditure management, ﬁnancial sec-
tor reform, trade issues, monetary policy, and exchange rate issues (IEO, 2007).
6 Selection issues can be described in terms of an underlying counterfactual prob-
lem. That is, a given country has an outcome (GDP per capita growth rate, say) with
treatment (under IMF program) and without treatment (not under IMF program).
Because a country cannot at the same time both receive and not receive a treatment,
the problem we face is one of missing data. Put differently, we don’t know what the
growth rate would have been for an IMF program country, had the country not been
under the program. If we could assume that counterfactual growth rates in IMF
can be satisfactorily addressed, the economics profession is left
with only an incomplete understanding of the complexities of the
growth process. By implication, the growth regression is likely
to be mis-speciﬁed. Nevertheless, the regression literature on the
impact of IMF programs has directed almost all of its attention
towards the selection problem. Some have relied on control func-
tion approaches (e.g., inverse Mills ratios) to construct selection
corrections. Others have simply used IV methods with external
instruments. In our view, the difﬁculties associated with a mis-
speciﬁed growth model are just as serious.7
Perhaps the most widely cited paper on the effects of IMF pro-
grams on economic growth is Przeworski and Vreeland (2000).
They rely on a production-function approach in order to account
for the sources of growth. To address the selection issue, Prze-
worski and Vreeland employ the somewhat complicated bivariate
probit model with partial observability to construct selection
corrections.8 These corrections are then used as controls in
their growth regression (alongside capital and labor) to calculate
expected growth rates for each country during each year. These
(hopefully) selection unbiased values are then averaged over all
country-years for both country-years under and not under IMF
programs. The difference is thus the net effect of IMF programs.9
Data span the 1970–2000 period and include for the most part
some 79 developing countries. The measures included to repre-
sent IMF programs cover the four main types of IMF agreements:
stand-by arrangement (SBA), the extended fund facility (EFF), the
structural adjustment facility (SAF), and the enhanced structural
adjustment facility (ESAF).10 The reason for including all programs
is according to the authors that the fundamental objectives of
these programs do not differ.11 Consequently, they only consider
whether a country is under or not under a loan agreement without
programs countries are well approximated by developing countries not under IMF
programs, the problem would (in principle) disappear. We would simply deﬁne the
“average impact” of IMF programs as the difference between the average growth
rate in the two groups of countries; i.e., program and non-program countries. How-
ever, since there is almost surely self-selection into treatment (i.e., countries that
turn to the IMF are different from those that do not), this is not a valid strategy. We
have to somehowaccount for this counterfactual problem in order to say something
about whether countries beneﬁt from access to IMF loan programs or not.
7 Numerous important methodological problems, which are often overlooked,
plague this literature. First, papers relying on a production-function approach
ignore the formal theory of aggregation, which shows that an aggregate produc-
tion function only exists under some extremely unlikely assumptions (Fisher, 1969;
Blackorby and Schworm, 1988; Felipe and Fisher, 2003; Temple, 2006). Indeed,
regression speciﬁcations are likely to be ad hoc. Second, even sidestepping aggre-
gation problems, the perpetual inventory method, which is used to construct a
measure of aggregate capital, is beset by systematic measurement error (Pritchett,
2000). This makes causal inference fail. Moreover, even sidestepping the two afore-
mentionedproblems,Mankiw(1995)andSolow(2001)highlight thatpapers relying
on Barro-type growth regressions suffer from a number of additional shortcom-
ings, including simultaneity (left-hand side and right-hand side variables are jointly
determined),multicollinearity (right-hand side variables are highly correlated), and
adegrees of freedomproblem(morevariables affect growth than there are countries
in the world).
8 They study participation in an IMF program as a joint decision by the country
and the IMF.
9 This approach relies on very strong priors. Most importantly, it is assumed
that unobserved factors, which inﬂuence the participation decision of the IMF and
the country government, respectively, are independent. Vreeland (2003) discusses
some of the difﬁculties of relaxing this assumption. To see what this assumption
entails consider geostrategic importance, which arguably is unobserved. Pakistan,
say, will beneﬁt from its geostrategic importance in negotiating an IMF program,
perhaps due to U.S. Treasury arm-twisting. At the same time, this may inﬂuence
Pakistan’s decision to approach the IMF. Yet such as scenario would violate the
independence assumption.
10 In September1999, the IMF terminated ESAF and replaced it with a new lending
facility for low-income countries, the Poverty Reduction andGrowth Facility (PRGF).
11 Conway (2006) raises the concern that papers stacking every IMF-supported
program to get sufﬁcient observations run the risk comparing apples and oranges.
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differentiation between different types of agreement. In the data
sample, there are a total of 678 agreements, and out of these 88%
are actually SBAs.
The average annual rate of growth of total income in the sample
was 3.33%. Countries participating in IMF programs grew at the
rate of 2.04%, while countries not under programs grew at 4.39%.
The difference amounts to minus 2.35 percentage points, and a key
question is the extent towhich this difference is due to respectively
prior conditions or to IMF program participation. The conclusion of
the Przeworski–Vreeland study is that IMF programs do “reduce
growth while countries remain under and do not return beneﬁts
that would compensate the losses once they leave” (Przeworski &
Vreeland, 2000, p. 403). Put differently, countries not entering IMF
programs grow faster than those entering, even when both groups
face similar initial conditions. In fact, the authors ﬁnd that of the
negative growth differential, 1.53 percentage points is due to IMF
programs (i.e., two-thirds).
Another inﬂuential paper on the effects of IMF programs on
economic growth is Barro and Lee (2005). They employ a growth
regression in which the right-hand side variables include different
policy measures and analyze the growth effects of IMF programs
for the period 1975–2000. Barro and Lee analyze SBA and EFF loans,
but they report that all results hold when all IMF loan facilities are
included in the measure of IMF presence. The point of departure
is to view the IMF as a bureaucratic and political organization. In
particular, Barro and Lee show that IMF loans are more likely to
be approved and are likely to be larger when countries are more
inﬂuential within the IMF. They gauge “country inﬂuence” by the
size of the country quota at the IMF and by the number of the IMF
professional staff originating from the country. In addition, they
consider the political and economic connections of each country to
the most inﬂuential members of the IMF; i.e., the United States and
the major countries of Western Europe. To measure these connec-
tions, they employ voting patterns in the United Nations and the
extent of bilateral trade linkages.
The empirical novelty is that they instrument IMF loan variables
with predicted loan values based on IMF quotas and staff shares,
fractions ofUNvotes alongwith theUnited States and theEuropean
countries, and the intensity of trade with the United States and the
European countries. They employ these instruments in a growth
regression and ﬁnd that participation in IMF loan programs has
a sizeable and signiﬁcantly negative effect on economic growth.
In sum, Barro and Lee corroborate the ﬁndings of Przeworski and
Vreeland (2000).12
Dreher (2006) emphasizes that an important shortcomingof the
above analyses is the failure to account for compliance with condi-
tionality. The problem is that country economic performance will
in all likelihood depend on program implementation. Conclusions
based on analyses that fail to discriminate according to the degree
of compliance among countries couldwell be biased. Dreher (2006)
attempts to account for the degree of compliance in an evaluation
of the effect of IMF programs on growth. He uses a dataset cover-
ing the period 1970–2000 with some 98 developing countries. He
uses the same explanatory variables as Barro and Lee (2005) plus
additional variables to account for compliance with conditionali-
12 The identiﬁcation assumption in the Barro-Lee study is that the aforementioned
political economy variables are exogenous with respect to economic outcome vari-
ables such as real per capita GDP growth. That is, factors which inﬂuence a country’s
growth trajectory should inﬂuenceneither thenumber of residents seeking employ-
ment at the IMF nor their voting behavior in the United Nations. Put differently, the
identiﬁcation strategy asks us to believe that a high share of Argentineans employed
by the IMF shouldnotbea reﬂectionof the fact thatArgentinahas experiencedﬁnan-
cial crises in the past, due to for instance an ingrained habit of populist economic
policies.
ties. Dreher makes use of three different compliance measures: (i)
a dummy variable for the suspension of an IMF program developed
byEdwards (2001); (ii) the shareof theagreed loanamount actually
disbursed proposed by Killick (1995); and (iii) a dummy variable
equal to one if at most 25% of the amount which would be available
for a certain year under equal phasing remained undrawn and zero
otherwise, a measure proposed by Dreher (2003).13
Dreher ﬁnds evidence that participation in IMF programs
reduces economic growth, and this continues to be the case even
after controlling for compliance with conditionality. Interestingly,
compliance with conditionality does seem to somehow reduce the
overall negative effect of IMF programs. Even so, Dreher concludes
that the overall impact remains substantially negative after taking
compliance into account.14
Easterly (2005a, 2005b) makes a departure from the
IV/counterfactual-based studies, and provides an analysis of
what he denotes as informative statistics. His fundamental insight
is that adjustment loans are dependent events: there is infor-
mation in the frequent repetition of loans to the same country.
Easterly ﬁrst notes that the probability of receiving an IMF or
World Bank adjustment loan is not decreasing in the number of
loans already received. If loans work according to intention (i.e., if
they are effective), we should expect this conditional probability
to be decreasing. Secondly, he shows that the macroeconomic
experience of the top 20 recipients of IMF or World Bank adjust-
ment loans over the 1980–1999 period is, on average, no different
from that of the average group of developing countries, and this
latter group contains countries with extreme macroeconomic
distortions. Moreover, the group of countries receiving adjustment
loans had a very high variance of macroeconomic outcomes.
This group includes countries with strong growth and no major
macroeconomic imbalances such as Uganda and Pakistan, and it
includes disasters such as Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire. According to
Easterly, the disasters provide bounds on our intuition on coun-
terfactual outcomes: it is necessary to believe that disaster cases
such as Zambia would have done even worse without repeated
adjustment lending. Obviously, selection bias can still be at work
for countries receiving repeated loans, but this raises the important
question as to why the IMF and the World Bank made new loans
to countries that so obviously failed to deliver reform in response
to old loans. Thirdly, Easterly considers the transition probability
from IDA (International Development Association) status into
HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) debt relief, conditional on
adjustment lending. IDA countries that received above-average
adjustment lending were much more like to become HIPCs as
compared to IDA countries receiving below-average adjustment
lending. Easterly (2005, p. 20) concludes that “[t]he big stylized
facts of adjustment lending suggest that structural adjustment
did not succeed in adjusting macroeconomic policy and growth
outcomes very much.”
To be sure, there are also studies such as Dicks-Mireaux,
Mecagni, and Schadler (2000) that ﬁnd a positive impact of IMF
programs on growth.15 Dicks-Mireaux et al. also subject their sta-
13 Vreeland (2006) contains a good discussion of how to measure compliance.
14 A problem with Dreher’s approach is that each of the three measures used
correspond with extreme non-compliance with structural conditionality. In our
experience, it is often the case that countries continue to receive the full amount of
agreed upon loans even when they are not in full compliance. An alternative inter-
pretation of Dreher’s results is simply that the countrieswhich are the furthest from
IMF conditions realize lower growth rates.
15 Conway (2006) summarizes research that ﬁnds a reduced growth rate in the
initial program year but a higher growth rate in the second year. This suggests
that measuring the effect over a longer period could lead to different conclusions.
Moreover, Fischer (2005) even argues that the “consensus” view is that the growth
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tistical model to a battery of diagnostic tests, and this leads the
authors to conclude: “Indeed, on the basis of this study, it cannot
be ruled out that the inherent limitations of panel data covering
countries facing highly diverse circumstances render it impossible
to obtain reliable estimates of the independent effects of IMF-
supported programs” (Dicks-Mireaux et al., 2000, p. 522).
The empirical evidence covered here is not favorable to the IMF.
At the same time, we concur with Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000) that
the methodological complexities are probably too involved for the
cross-country literature to be able to provide a sound basis for
drawing unambiguous conclusions as to the impact of IMF struc-
tural conditionality. We therefore proceed in Sections 4 and 5 to
review IMF programs from a different perspective, ﬁrst assessing
the IMF’s changing theoretical paradigm and then considering a
broader literature on growth determinants as it relates to IMF con-
ditionality.
4. Institutions fundamentalism
Alongside the studies addressing the growth impact of IMF
programs there is a literature that tries to understand the impor-
tance ofmacroeconomic policies for growth.Muchof this literature
attempts to make a distinction between policies and institutions
(Easterly, 2005a, 2005b). Countrieswith poormacroeconomic poli-
cies, including high inﬂation, large budget deﬁcits, and overvalued
exchange rates, have deﬁnitely suffered more macroeconomic
volatility and grown more slowly during the postwar period. How-
ever, countries with poor macroeconomic policy records also have
weak institutions. Poor macroeconomic policies are not pursued
because politicians believe that high inﬂation or an overval-
ued exchange rate foster economic growth. Instead, they reﬂect,
according to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2003), underlying
institutional challenges. To illustrate, an overvalued exchange rate
offers one avenue by which resources can be funneled away from
the agricultural sector towards urban interests, a policy intended
to keep incumbent governments in power in “institutionallyweak”
societies. According to this logic, poor macroeconomic policies
are symptoms of weak institutions. Indeed, Acemoglu et al. (2003)
show that once they control for the causal effect of institutions (or
more accurately, the historically determined component of insti-
tutions) on volatility and economic performance, macroeconomic
policies no longer play a direct role.16 This result is reinforced by
what appears as amacroeconomic conundrum:Why has improved
macroeconomic stability not led to the expected growth pay-
off? Over the 1990s, for instance, developing countries made real
progress in terms of ﬁscal consolidation and inﬂation, an improve-
ment that was also instrumental in bringing about a reduction in
output volatility (Montiel & Servén, 2006). Yet the growth dividend
certainly fell far short of expectations (Easterly, 2001; Montiel &
Servén, 2006).
Montiel and Servén (2006) argue that insufﬁcient institutional
reform holds the key to this puzzle. With forward-looking pri-
vate agents, decisions to invest are inﬂuenced by both current
macroeconomic stability and the perceived likelihood of future
macroeconomic stability. To signiﬁcantly inﬂuence growth, cur-
rate is reduced initially, but that it revives as structural reforms take root.
16 Glaeser et al. (2004) present a conﬂicting view. They argue that the measures of
institutions employed are ﬂawed, and more appropriate measures are not signiﬁ-
cant determinants of growth. In addition, Albouy (2008) questions the construction
of the historically determined component of institutions employed by Acemoglu et
al. (2003) (i.e., the celebrated settler mortality instrument). Indeed, Albouy demon-
strates that the “corrected” settler mortality instrument no longer spans exogenous
variation in institutions. This renders the conclusions of Acemoglu et al. (2003)
problematic.
rent macroeconomic stability must be seen by the private sector
as credible and sustainable. That is, it must be indicative of a
permanent shift in the macroeconomic policy regime. For this to
happen, macroeconomic policy must be built on solid institutional
foundations. More speciﬁcally, a temporary reduction in deﬁcit
monetization is not too difﬁcult to achieve, but unless long-lasting
increases in the primary surplus are somehow institutionalized,
continuing pressures on the government budget will increase the
likelihood of future monetization (Montiel & Servén, 2006). This
discourages private investment and thus economic growth.
This type of reasoning has led to a sort of “institutions fun-
damentalism” (Rodrik, 2006). While “getting prices right” was
the message of the original Washington Consensus in the early
1980s, “getting institutions right” has been in vogue over the
past decade. It has become part of what Rodrik (2006) calls the
augmented Washington Consensus. Speciﬁcally, Rodrik (2006, p.
978) deﬁnes the augmented Washington Consensus as the original
Washington Consensus plus the following items: corporate gover-
nance, anti-corruption, ﬂexible labor markets, WTO agreements,
ﬁnancial codes and standards, “prudent” capital-account open-
ing, non-intermediate exchange rate regimes, independent central
banks/inﬂation targeting, social safety nets, and targeted poverty
reduction. Consequently, the policy template used by the IMF has
undergone evolutionary change (i.e., from original to augmented
Washington Consensus) as manifest by the IMF’s increasing advo-
cacy of institutional reforms.
Such evolutionary change has, by and large, been perceived as
“soundeconomics”by themainstreamof theeconomicsprofession.
Indeed, it is in full accord with the “institutions rule” literature (see
Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004). Yet, as we will argue below,
heterodox approaches to economic development have been seri-
ously challenging this mainstream view. In fact, we believe that
the heterodox stance is slowly becoming the newmainstreamview
(see World Bank, 2005). The unclear track record associated with
structural conditionality in conjunction with the manifest use of
heterodox policies in rapidly growing Asian economies (especially
China) has greatly accelerated this process. In contrast, the IMF
maintains that inadequate compliance and backsliding are at the
core of the lack of success. Rodrik (2006, p. 977) summarizes the
IMF position as “do more of the same, and do it well.” This probably
also explainswhy the IEO (2007) chose todeﬁneprogramefﬁciency
in terms of being effective in bringing about follow-up structural
reforms as well as whether reforms were sustained over time as
opposed to fostering economic growth.17 By a revealed preference
type argument, this suggests that the IEO deems that the current
IMF policy template is appropriate.
5. Binding constraints
Critics hold that the type of institutional reforms pursued by
the IMF is heavily tilted towards a best-practice model (Bromley
& Yao, 2006; Easterly, 2008; Evans, 2004; Rodrik, 2006, 2008).
The best-practice model presumes that it is possible ex ante to
settle on a unique set of appropriate institutional arrangements
(best-practices), and that convergence towards these institutional
arrangements is attractive. Paradoxically, the best-practice model
doesnotﬁtwellwith the fact thatmanygrowth “miracles” are char-
acterized by heterodox institutional arrangements (Rodrik, 2005).
China and Vietnam, for instance, continue to retain many social-
ist characteristics. Some authors also emphasize the importance of
building reforms on pre-existing institutions and making reforms
17 This touches upon our distinction in Section 2 between ﬁrst order (growth) and
second order (compliance) issues.
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incentive compatible (Qian, 2003; Rodrik, 2005). Rodrik (2005)
asserts that the ﬁrst order principles of reform should embody
market-oriented incentives,macroeconomic stability, andoutward
orientation, but these “principles” can be implemented under a
variety of institutional arrangements. He argues that this is indica-
tive of huge “missing links” in our knowledge of what generates
sustained economic growth.
Turning to more speciﬁc criticisms of the best-practice model,
it can be highlighted that it ignores both the existence of binding
constraints (and, by implications, a sense of reform priority) and
second best issues.18 Rodrik (2007) provides a nice discussion of
these twoconcepts against thebackdropof theChinese agricultural
reform. In 1978, a common suggestion was that agricultural sec-
tor distortion was the most important constraint holding back the
Chinese economy. At the time, however, most economists would
probably have opted for abolition of state controlled prices and
the privatization of farmland. However, such policies would have
been dangerous as has been amply demonstrated elsewhere. For
instance, since the difference between purchase and sales prices of
crops formed part of the tax base, bringing the state procurement
system to an end would have diminished a signiﬁcant source of
government revenue. Such second best concerns must be factored
in when designing reforms. The Chinese dual-track approach to
agricultural market liberalization (i.e., freeing output prices at the
margin while keeping the plan intact and maintaining distorted
fertilizer prices) did just that (Qian, 2003; Rodrik, 2007).19
Collier (2007) provides an illustrative example of the “speci-
ﬁcity” of binding constraints. Bangladesh and Chad both have
endemic corruption. Yet despite being a very corrupt country,
Bangladesh has experienced decent growth. Chad, on the other
hand, has not done well. According to Collier, this is due to dif-
ferences in opportunities. Bangladesh is a resource-scarce, coastal,
low-income country. Its development path is clear: export labor-
intensive manufactures and services. This development strategy
is not very demanding in terms of government. Not so for Chad,
an oil-rich, aid-abundant, landlocked, low-income country. Chad
is not well-located for exporting, and to make good use of aid and
oil requires a reasonably good government. That is, Chad’s govern-
ment must do more than “do-no-harm”, it must really do some
good. Corruption is thus much more harmful for Chadians than for
Bangladeshi. In fact, what Collier is saying is that corruption is a
binding constraint in Chad, but not in Bangladesh.
The importance of binding constraints is backed by empirical
results reported in Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005a). These
authors have studied a set of growth accelerations (i.e., increases
in growth of GDP per capita) that were sustained for at least
eight years, that had a post-acceleration growth rate of at least
3.5% per year, and (to rule out cases of pure recovery) that had
18 The theorem of the second best states that removing an arbitrarily chosen dis-
tortion in an economy with multiple distortions may reduce welfare (Lipsey and
Lancaster, 1956).
19 As noted by a referee, second best issues also feature prominently in the litera-
ture on the optimal sequencing of reforms (see Edwards, 1989; Rybczynski, 1991).
For instance, the conventional approach to stabilizationunder structural adjustment
programs during the 1980s was based on a two-step approach. First, macroeco-
nomic stabilization was seen as necessary in order to achieve equilibrium and for
optimization of (static) welfare. Second, microeconomic reforms were deemed nec-
essary in order to ensure the proper working of the price mechanism. Rybczynski
(1991) emphasizes that particularly the second step has weak theoretical foun-
dations when viewed through the lens of the theorem of second best. In fact, all
reforms have to be carried out simultaneously in order to increase welfare unam-
biguously, as any perturbation of the order of implementation may lead to a loss
in welfare. Accordingly, the timing and interrelation of microeconomic (or struc-
tural) reforms in relation to macroeconomic stabilization remains without a ﬁrm
theoretical foundation.
post-acceleration output exceeding the pre-episode peak level of
income. Using a large cross-country sample spanning the period
since the1950s,Hausmannetal. ﬁnd80episodesof growthacceler-
ations. Of these growth accelerations, only 14.5% are accompanied
by standard macroeconomic reforms. That is, more than 85% of
all growth accelerations are not associated with reforms. Haus-
mann et al. conclude that growth accelerations are mainly caused
by idiosyncratic, and often small-scale, changes. This is consistent
with the idea that a set of country-speciﬁc binding constraints may
in fact be holding down the economy’s growth rate.
Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2005) propose a theoretical
framework for thinking about binding constraints to growth,which
is rooted explicitly in a second best context. The governing idea
is that a few focused policy interventions (i.e., removal of a small
number of key binding constraints to growth) will have a larger
impact on growth than the traditional approach based on imple-
menting a fairly long list of reforms.
To focus their ideas, Hausmann et al. consider an economy
where market imperfections and distortions are pervasive. From
the formal theory of second best we know that removing an arbi-
trarily chosen distortion in an economy with multiple distortions
may reduce welfare. The only way a reformer can be sure to
increase welfare is by wholesale reform. This is obviously not oper-
ational since it requires completeknowledgeof all distortions in the
economy, including those that do not arise as a result of some gov-
ernment intervention. In an economy with multiple distortions, a
marginal reduction in a single distortion leads to a direct effect on
aggregate welfare by an amount given by the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the constraint linked with this distortion. In other
words, the multiplier is the marginal beneﬁt in welfare units from
slightly reducing the speciﬁc distortion, disregarding the effects
on all other distorted activities. The more the distortion binds, the
larger is the direct effect. There are also indirect effects from reduc-
ing the distortion on the targeted activity. There is an effect on the
weighted sum of the wedges between social and private valuations
on all other activities,where theweights are the own-multipliers of
each distorted activity. If, on average, the effect is to reduce these
wedges, ceteris paribus, the reduction in the targeted distortion
gives rise to an additional welfare beneﬁt. If, however, it tends to
increase the wedges, the welfare gain is reduced or, if the indirect
effect is sufﬁciently strong, turned into a welfare loss. This is the
theory of second best in operation.
Hausmann, Rodrik, et al. (2005b, p. 5) maintain that the current
thinkingonpolicy reform forgets all about the theoryof secondbest
and simply goes for “whatever reforms seem to be feasible, prac-
tical, politically doable, or enforceable through conditionality.20
This is a “shotgun” approach to reform that implicitly relies on the
notions that (i) any reform is good; (ii) the more areas reformed,
the better; and (iii) the deeper the reform in any area, the better.” In
the presence of multiple economic distortions, we have no assur-
ance that a given reform is welfare enhancing. Welfare need not be
increasing in the number of reform areas, except (in theory) in the
extreme case of wholesale reform.
According to Hausmann et al. reform priorities should be
designed according to the magnitude of direct effects cognizant of
second best interactions that could reverse positivewelfare effects.
Their (implicit) empirical assumption is that direct effects from
eliminating themost binding constraintswill dominate deleterious
indirect effects. They attempt to make their approach operational
by developing a “tree”, close in spirit to the trouble-shooting
20 While Hausmann, Pritchett, et al. (2005a) address policy reform and condi-
tionally more generally, we read Rodrik (2006, p. 977) as directing this critique
particularly at the IMF.
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sections of product manuals (Dixit, 2007). They suggest that pol-
icy practitioners should look not at speciﬁc distortions, but at
proximate determinants of growth (saving, investment, education,
productivity, infrastructure, etc.) in order to identify symptoms
thatmaybe associatedwith poor growth.21 Once it is knownwhere
to focus, reformers can look for associated economic distortions
whose removal may be expected to produce the “biggest bang for
the reform buck.”
While the fundamental idea in growth diagnostics (i.e., that
the removal of a set of key constraints will have a larger impact
on growth than the traditional approach based on a longer list
of reforms) has much intuitive appeal, the framework remains
incomplete in a formal (mathematical) sense. Firstly, as noted by
Rodriquez (2005), from the theory of non-linear programming we
know that changing one policy at a time will generally be a very
inefﬁcient way of reaching an optimal outcome. Secondly, and
most important, the robustness of the growthdiagnostics approach
vis-à-vis second best problems is actually unknown.22 We know
fromgeneral equilibrium analysis that if a government for instance
wants to select a public investment program based on generated
income, selecting the one with the highest value added may not in
general be optimal. Another investment, with lower value added,
may have a higher production income multiplier (Raa, 2005). That
is, we cannot in general say that looking for higher direct effects is
the optimal path to follow.23
Consequently, the main attractiveness of the growth diagnos-
tics framework lies not in its immediate practical applicability
and/or formal elegance. Instead, it lies in its insistence that not
all distortions are equally important. As such, growth diagnostics
encouragesus to set apart reforms that are essential for growth from
those that are desirable (Leipziger&Zagha, 2006). To the extent that
the capacity for reform is limited inmanydeveloping countries, this
is important.
In sum, while on a conceptual level the binding constraints
approach is appealing, an application via growth diagnostics is
limited by our imperfect knowledge of the impact of alternative
development strategies and policies. This suggests that searching
with experimentation and learning is required in order to achieve
better reform outcomes. Recent literature has emphasized the role
of policy experimentation in the process of reforming an economy
(e.g., Heilmann, 2008). It must be stressed, however, that policy
experimentation (or policy trialing) is not free-wheeling trial and
error. It is an open-minded and purposeful activity rooted in eco-
nomic theory and local knowledge. Policy trialing by IMF staff
would surely imply that conditionality is allowed to diverge from
the principles of the augmented Washington Consensus. Mission
staff would, for example, be allowed to explore and put pro-
grams together without immediate devaluations. Looser monetary
and ﬁscal policy in times of recession would also be considered,
21 According to Dixit (2007), this approach is attractive. It looks atmultiple dimen-
sionsof economicoutcomesand it tries tonarrowdowncauses fromaset ofmultiple
possibilities. However, the sequential mode of thinking based on a given tree struc-
ture is problematic as it does not take into account the probabilistic nature of the
exercise. This shortcoming leads Dixit to propose a Bayesian approach to growth
diagnostics, which allows reformers to explicitly make probabilistic statements
about binding constraints. Carlin and Seabright (2007, p. 3) add that “we need to add
an assessment of the feasibility and the costs of improving the relevant constraints.”
22 Jones (2008), however, constructs a model in which linkages and complemen-
tarities can amplify the macroeconomic effects of small microeconomic distortions.
Heargues that in thismodel, the approachofHausmann, Rodrik, et al. (2005b)would
work well. This suggests that focusing on key binding constraints could be effective.
Yet indirect effects can obviously not be ignored.
23 Further complications include how to address uncertainty and whether the
objective of policy makers should be to maximize expected value or ensure the
best outcome under worst-case scenarios.
and continuation of certain aspects of trade protection would not
be automatically ruled out. A key role for government in areas
normally targeted for privatization would also be feasible, and
a considerable degree of restraint would be characteristic when
deregulating the banking sector in order to reduce the risk of ﬁnan-
cial crisis.
6. Towards policy trialing
The policy trialing and binding constraints framework is best
suited to assessing the critical elements of broad development
strategy. Indeed, this framework emerged within a literature that
is much broader than the IMF conditionality reform debate. Policy
trialing is most relevant to project and program decisions, where
country diversity and outcome uncertainty are greatest; and it is
best implemented by entities that must take a broad perspective to
development,which shouldbe the focusofnational governments. If
the IMF streamlines its conditions so as to focus on core competen-
cies, the IMFwill be less involved in thebroad rangeofdevelopment
decisions than it has been in the past. The World Bank and bilateral
donors, with their focus on microeconomic decisions, would be the
entitiesmost concernedwith implementing thesenewapproaches.
The IMF would need to coordinate with the World Bank, and with
bilateral donors, more so than it has in the past (Malan, 2007). To
the extent that policy trialing is relevant to the IMF, it will be in
macroeconomic policy.
Currently, however, the IMF is not well-suited to adopt macroe-
conomic policy trialing as an approach to reform. There are at least
two reasons for this. Firstly, the IMF is plagued by a lack of intellec-
tual diversity (so-called intellectual monocropping) and a policy
template that is overly rigid (e.g., Evans and Finnemore, 2001;
Stiglitz, 2004; Momani, 2005, 2007; Taylor, 1997). Secondly, IMF
staff face an incentive structure that does not encourage risk taking
(Woods, 2006). In what follows we elaborate on these assertions.
Prominent critics such as Stiglitz (2004) have argued that the
IMF policy template is excessively neoclassical and based in large
part on ideology.24 The IEO (2004, p. 17) evaluation of the Poverty
Reduction Strategy observes that a major external criticism of the
IMF is that “[a]lternative policy options – especially ones that
deviate from the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ – are rarely
explored.” Moreover, as an integral part of the millennium review
of conditionality, the IMF held and participated in numerous sem-
inars around the world. According to Boughton (2003), one of the
24 The IMF’s adherence to orthodoxy has probably nowhere been as pronounced
as in the case of capital-market liberalization. According to Stiglitz (2004), the IMF
attempted to change its charter in September 1997 in order to force capital-market
liberalization on reluctant developing countries, and they did so despite a lack
of empirical evidence that capital-market liberalization would beneﬁt developing
countries. In fact, World Bank researchers, among others, had shown that such poli-
cies were systematically associated with increased instability (e.g., Demirgüz-Kunt
and Detragiache, 1998). Even so, IMF’s Managing Director kept calling for capital-
market liberalization two years after the Asian crisis, an event that had clearly
shown the risks associated with this policy. According to Stiglitz, the IMF insis-
tence on capital-market liberalization was based neither on theory (when theory
was invoked, itwas theneoclassicalmodelwithno imperfections; not the asymmet-
ric information model, which holds radically different implications) nor empirics.
Rather, it was based in ideology. It is quite revealing to look at how the capital-
market liberalization thesis has evolved in light of actual liberalization experience.
The disastrous results of liberalizations in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in the
Southern Cone countries, induced a ﬁrst round of revisions. It was argued that
macroeconomic instability and inadequate bank supervisionwere themain culprits.
Later, the optimal order of liberalization received substantial attention. Liberaliza-
tionneeded sequencing and reformshad tobemanaged carefully in order to become
successful. In view of the Asian crisis, arguments addressing moral hazard problems
in relation to deposit insurance were advanced. Yet, during all these rounds of post
hoc revisions, the fundamental premise that capital market liberalization would
beneﬁt developing countries was never (openly) questioned.
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strongest and most consistent criticisms expressed at those semi-
nars was that countries had too little ﬂexibility in deciding how or
when to implement reforms.
Thisdoesnotmean that the IMFpolicy templatehasnot evolved.
Asarguedabove, conditionalityhasbroadened (i.e.,moved fromthe
original to the augmented Washington Consensus) but the original
thinking remains entrenched.25 Easterly (2005b, p. 3) captures this
well: “IMF and World Bank conditionality has evolved over time,
but there is a common element of macro adjustment and getting
prices right that has remained constant from the beginning.”
Momani (2005) has conducted interviews with former IMF
staff and executive directors, who do not ﬁnd the IMF’s economic
paradigm wrong or misguided. Many recognize that the IMF has a
homogenous and monolithic nature, but stress that no alternative
economic paradigm is credible. Momani ﬁnds that there appears to
be consensus on the utility of the IMF’s prescribed economic poli-
cies. Indeed, these views are epitomized in the following statement
from a speech by Anne O. Krueger (2004), who at the time was the
IMF Acting Managing Director: “Economic policymaking is, by its
nature, uncertain. There canbeno absolute guarantees, in the sense
that policy X will produce a growth rate of Y%. But we do know what
works, and what doesn’t.” (Emphasis added).
Reﬂecting on the IMF involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Woods (2006, p. 178) ﬁnds that “[t]oo often speciﬁc policy advice
has been fashioned according to easy blueprints rather than hard
research – ideological presumptions rather than tested theories.”
Woods also points to key reasons for such inﬂexibility embedded
in part in staff incentives. She argues that originality in program
design would increase the probability of a loan being rejected by
the IMF board, and innovation would shift the burden of respon-
sibility in the event of program failure towards individual staff
members responsible fordrafting theprogram. In contrast, building
on a standard policy template reduces the responsibility of individ-
uals and shifts the burden to the institution at large. It amounts to
a rational risk-averse strategy, especially for junior staff. They are
hard-pressed for time and their experience and expertise is typ-
ically more theoretical than practical.26 In sum, when providing
policy advice, IMF staff face very powerful incentives not to devi-
ate from the standard policy template, and perhaps the same holds
for the organization at large (Woods, 2006). Thus, besides provid-
ing a “micro-foundation” explaining why structural conditionality
is rigid, Woods’ analysis suggests that the conditions for effective
policy trialing do not exist within the current IMF structure.27
Woods’ (2006) insights suggest that bringing organizational
reform at the staff level into focus must be productive. Indeed,
Evans and Finnemore (2001, p. 2) assert that: “acknowledging the
lessons from organizational theory leads ﬁrmly to the conclusion
that the way in which the Fund’s staff is recruited, trained, orga-
nized and rewardedmust be a central determinant of how the Fund
deﬁnes and executes its mandate.” A key question is then: What
would an organizational reform aimed at encouraging risk taking
look like?
25 See Rodrik (2006, p. 977) for a similar view.
26 IMF staff in Africa are generally younger, staff turnover (including mission
chiefs) is much higher in Africa, and fewer staff resources are invested in programs
there (Woods, 2006).
27 Despite an adherence to orthodoxy, the details of implementation recognize
the speciﬁcs of individual country contexts. This also explains Stone’s (2007, p. 9)
ﬁnding that: “there is no basis for the charge that the IMF imposes a one-size-ﬁts-all
template of conditions.” While the IMF adheres to the principle of privatization in
many of its conditions, application is to sectors that are relevant in each country:
the IMF understands that cotton is the key sector to target in Mali and Burkina Faso,
while cocoa may be key in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. Policy trialing by IMF staff, on
the other hand, is something different. It would mean that conditionality would be
allowed to deviate from the principles of the augmented Washington Consensus.
By way of an answer, we call attention to an important ﬁrst
order principle for any such reform, a principle that is highlighted by
Heilmann (2008) in his studies of policy experimentation in China.
Speciﬁcally, in China’s hierarchical structure initiation of exper-
imental policies normally comes from within the government.
Yet experimental efforts are usually set off by local policymak-
ers, who obtain informal backing for their pilot projects from a
higher-level government patron. Indeed, encouragement and pro-
tection by patrons is an important “policy hedging mechanism”
since unhedged policy initiatives are risky career-wise. In hierar-
chical systems, bottom-upexperimentation is unthinkablewithout
the backing of higher-level patrons. Initiation of experimentation
must be built around local initiative and central sponsorship. The
lesson from this discussion is that organizational IMF reform at the
staff level will incite policy trialing only if there is a change in the
mindset at the Board level. Put differently, if the Board remains
entrenched in orthodoxy, status quo will persevere.
Beyond the issues discussed by Woods (2006) such as increas-
ing incentives for risk taking, Evans and Finnemore (2001) and
Momani (2007) propose a broadening of staff recruitment.28 Evans
and Finnegan in particular propose increasing the voice of devel-
oping member countries through staff recruitment, which would
serve to increase “local knowledge.” Local knowledge is important
at the IMF since economic reforming has a “craft” character. In craft
work “[. . .] procedures are non-routine, and the work depends to a
considerable degree on experimentation and intuition.” (Evans and
Finnemore, 2001, p. 9). Each national economy is unique, which
is why IMF programs must be tailored to the particular national
context. This is perhaps most pertinent when the IMF ventures
beyond macroeconomic stabilization and into the area of institu-
tional reform.
7. Concluding remarks
Recent IMF rhetoric about the goals of the institution has put
emphasis on economic growth. While econometric evidence is
subject to considerable methodological criticism, and must be
interpreted with caution, broad evidence suggests that the institu-
tion has failed to deliver on this objective, largely due to a rigid and
orthodox approach to economic policymaking. The unimpressive
track record has led to calls for a refocusing of the IMF.
The IEO (2004, p. 17) evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy observes that a major external criticism of the IMF is that
“[a]lternative policy options – especially ones that deviate from
the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ – are rarely explored.”More-
over, the IEO (2004, p. 18) states that “to understand the linkages
between policies [. . .] and growth/poverty reduction requires a
good understanding of the macro-micro linkages in a particular
country context, including the nature of country-speciﬁc insti-
tutional characteristics [. . .].” This internal evaluation certainly
suggests an admission of previous problems.
The Malan (2007) report advises that the IMF should with-
draw from development ﬁnance altogether. In contrast, Lombardi
(2007a, 2007b) argues there is an important role to play for the IMF
in developing countries. The IMF supplies a bundled set of activi-
ties, including lending, policy advice, and information-gathering
services, many of which entail an element of public good. In any
case, an IMF that is entrenched in orthodoxywill not be able to play
a useful role in policy reform and development efforts across the
developing countries at large. What is needed is an open-minded
28 FormerManagingDirectorHorst Kohlerwanted tohire fewermacroeconomists.
He found this group unimaginative and unable to think out of the box; instead, he
wanted to hire more MBAs and former policy practitioners (Momani, 2007).
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IMF that iswilling todeviate fromorthodoxy.Both identifyingbind-
ing constraints to growthand trial anderror in settingdevelopment
policy require collaboration among national governments, the IMF,
the World Bank and bilateral donors, and taking a broad view of
development strategy. Moreover, policy trialing may be easier to
implement for projects andprograms than itwill be for streamlined
IMF conditionality that focuses on its core competencies.
In order to incite a change in the IMF approach to reform in low-
income countries,we advocate organizational reformat bothBoard
and staff level. Reforms aimed at changing the governance struc-
ture of the IMF are critically important if the institution is to stay
relevant and trusted (El-Erian, 2007; Evans and Finnemore, 2001;
Momani, 2007). The real challenge in reforming the IMF, however,
is for its leadership to acknowledge the signiﬁcance of failures from
implementing augmented Washington Consensus type policies.
Much is at stake if the IMF remains unreformed, a conclusionwhich
the evolving global credit crisis and experiences in the developing
countries over the past 25 years so vividly illustrate.
Acknowledgements
We thank John Rand, seminar participants at the Danish Devel-
opment Days (Copenhagen, 10 June 2008), and two anonymous
referees for useful comments. The usual caveats apply.
References
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2003). Institutional causes, macroeco-
nomic symptoms: Volatility, crises and growth. Journal of Monetary Economics,
50, 49–123.
Albouy, D. (2008). The colonial origins of comparative development: An Investigating
of the settler mortality data (NBER Working Paper 14130).
Barro, R., & Lee, J. (2005). IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?
Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 1245–1269.
Bird, G. (2007). The IMF: A bird’s eye view of its role and operations. Journal of
Economic Surveys, 21, 683–745.
Bird, G., & Willett, T. (2004). IMF conditionality, implementation and the new polit-
ical economy of ownership. Comparative Economic Studies, 46, 423–450.
Blackorby, C., & Schworm, W. (1988). The existence of input and output aggregates
in aggregate production functions. Econometrica, 56, 613–643.
Boughton, J. (2003). Who’s in charge? Ownership and conditionality in IMF-
supported programs.Washington, InternationalMonetary Fund (Working Paper,
WP/03/191).
Bromley, D., & Yao, Y. (2006). Understanding China’s economic transformation: Are
there lessons for the developing world? World Economics, 7, 73–95.
Carlin, W., & Seabright, P. (2007). Bring me sunshine: Which parts of the business
climate should public policy try to ﬁx? Paper presented at the Annual World Bank
Conference on Development Economics, Bred Slovenia.
Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conway, P. (2006). The international monetary fund in a time of crisis: A review
of Stanley Fischer’s IMF essays from a time of crisis: The international ﬁnan-
cial system, stabilization, and development. Journal of Economic Literature, 44,
115–144.
Dicks-Mireaux, L, Mecagni, M., & Schadler, S. (2000). Evaluating the effect of
IMF lending to low-income countries. Journal of Development Economics, 61,
495–526.
Dixit, A. (2007). Evaluating recipes for development success. World Bank Research
Observer, 22, 131–157.
Dreher, A. (2003). The inﬂuence of elections on IMF program interruptions. Journal
of Development Studies, 39, 101–120.
Dreher, A. (2006). IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, Loans, and
Compliance with Conditionality. World Development, 34, 769–788.
Easterly, W. (2001). The lost decades: Developing countries’ stagnation in spite of
policy reform 1980–1998. Journal of Economic Growth, 6, 135–157.
Easterly, W. (2005a). National policies and economic growth: A reappraisal. In P.
Aghion, & S. Durlauf (Eds.), Handbook of economic growth (pp. 1015–1059). Else-
vier Publishers. doi:10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01015-4
Easterly, W. (2005b). What did structural adjustment adjust?: The association of
policies andgrowthwith repeated IMFandworldbankadjustment loans. Journal
of Development Economics, 76, 1–22.
Easterly, W. (2008). Institutions: Top down or bottom up? Mimeo: New York Univer-
sity.
Edwards, S. (1989). On the sequencing of structural reforms (NBER Working Paper,
No. 3138).
Edwards, S. (2001). Crime and punishment: Understanding IMF sanctioning prac-
tices. Mimeo, Rutgers University.
El-Erian, M. (2007). When markets collide: Investment strategies for the age of global
economic change. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Evans, P. (2004). Development as institutional change: The pitfalls ofmonocropping
and the potentials of deliberation. Studies in Comparative International Develop-
ment, 38, 30–52.
Evans, P., & Finnemore, M. (2001). Organizational reform and the expansion of the
South’s voice at the Fund. G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 15, December.
Felipe, J., & Fisher, F. (2003). Aggregation in production functions: What applied
economists should know. Metroeconomica, 54, 208–262.
Fisher, F. (1969). The existence of aggregate production functions. Econometrica, 37,
553–577.
Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopes-De-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004). Do institutions
cause growth? Journal of Economic Growth, 9, 271–303.
Goldstein, M. (2001). IMF structural conditionality: How much is too much? (Working
Paper 01-4), Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Hausmann, R., Pritchett, L., & Rodrik, D. (2005a). Growth accelerations. Mimeo, Har-
vard University.
Hausmann, R., Rodrik,D., &Velasco, A. (2005b). Growthdiagnostics.Mimeo,Harvard
University.
Heilmann, S. (2008). Policy experimentation in China’s economic rise. Studies in
Comparative International Development, 43, 1–26.
Independent Evaluation Ofﬁce (2004). Evaluation of the IMF’s role in Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. Washington,
D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Independent Evaluation Ofﬁce. (2007). An IEO evaluation of structural conditionality
in IMF-supported programs. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
International Monetary Fund. (2005, September). IMF conditionality. Factsheet.
Jones, C. (2008). Intermediate goods, weak links, and superstars: A theory of economic
development (NBER Working Paper 13834).
Killick, T. (1995). IMFprogrammes in developing countries:Design and impact. London:
Routledge.
Krueger, A. (2004). Meant well, tried little, failed much: Policy reforms in emerging
market economies. Roundtable Lecture EconomicHonors Society, NewYorkUni-
versity.
Leipziger, D., & Zagha, R. (2006). Getting out of the rut. Finance and
Development, 43. Available online at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
fandd/2006/03/index.htm
Lipsey, R., & Lancaster, K. (1956). The general theory of second best. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 24, 11–32.
Lombardi, D. (2007). The development dimension of IMF lending policies. Interna-
tional Spectator, 42, 95–113.
Lombardi, D. (2007b). The role of the IMF in low-income countries. Avail-
able online at: http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/Files/rc/speeches/2007/
0924imf/0924imf.pdf
Malan Report. (2007). Report on the External Review Committee on Bank-
Fund Collaboration. Available online at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/
eng/2007/022307.pdf
Mankiw, N. (1995). The growth of nations. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 26,
275–326.
Momani, B. (2005). Recruiting and diversifying IMF technocrats. Global Society, 19,
167–187.
Momani, B. (2007). IMF staff: Missing link in fund reform proposals. Review of Inter-
national Organizations, 2, 39–57.
Montiel, P., & Servén, L. (2006). Macroeconomic stability in developing countries:
How much is enough? World Bank Research Observer, 21, 178–551.
Pritchett, L. (2000). The tyrannyof concepts: CUDIE (cumulated, depreciated, invest-
ment effort) is not capital. Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 361–384.
Przeworski, A.,&Vreeland, J. (2000). Theeffectof IMFprogramsoneconomicgrowth.
Journal of Development Economics, 62, 385–421.
Qian, Y. (2003). How reform worked in China. In D. Rodrik (Ed.), Search of prosper-
ity: Analytic narratives on economic growth (pp. 297–333). Princeton University
Press.
Raa, T. (2005). The economics of input-output analysis. Cambridge University Press.
Rodrik, D. (2005). Growth strategies. In P. Aghion, & S. Durlauf (Eds.), Handbook
of economic growth (pp. 967–1014). Elsevier Publishers. doi:10.1016/S1574-
0684(05)01014-2
Rodrik, D. (2006). Goodbye Washington consensus, hello Washington confusion?
A review of the World Bank’s economic growth in the 1990s: Learning from a
decade of reform. Journal of Economic Literature, XLIV, 973–987.
Rodrik, D., 2008. Second-best institutions. Mimeo, Harvard University.
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions rule: The primacy of
institutions over geography and integration in economic development. Journal
of Economic Growth, 9, 131–165.
Rodrik, D. (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Eco-
nomic Growth. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Rybczynski, T. (1991). The sequencing of reform. Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
7, 26–34.
Solow, R. (2001). Applying growth theory across countries. World Bank Economic
Review, 15, 283–288.
Stiglitz, J. (2000). Reﬂections on the theory and practice of reform. In A. O. Krueger
(Ed.), Economic policy reform: The second stage (pp. 551–584). University of
Chicago Press.
Stiglitz, J. (2001). Failure of the fund: Rethinking the IMF response. Harvard Interna-
tional Review, 23, 14–18.
Author's personal copy
26 P. Abbott et al. / The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 50 (2010) 17–26
Stiglitz, J. (2004). Capital-market liberalization, globalization, and the IMF. Oxford
Review of Economic policy, 20, 57–71.
Stone, R. (2007). The scope of IMF conditionality. Mimeo, University of Rochester.
Taylor, L. (1997). Editorial: The revival of the liberal creed – The IMF
and the world bank in a globalized economy. World Development, 25,
145–152.
Temple, J. (2006). Aggregate production functions and growth economics. Interna-
tional Review of Applied Economics, 20, 301–317.
Vreeland, J. (2003). The IMF and economic development. Cambridge University Press.
Vreeland, J. (2006). IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus pol-
icy speciﬁc research strategies. Review of International Organizations, 1,
359–378.
Wade, R. (1990). Governing the market. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press.
Woods, N. (2006). The globalizers: The IMF, theworld bank and their borrowers. Prince-
ton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
World Bank. (1993). The East Asianmiracle: Economic growth and public policy.Wash-
ington, D.C.: Oxford University Press.
World Bank. (2005). Economic growth in the 1990s: Learning from a decade of reform.
Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press.
